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CAN THE "LONG-ARM" REACH OUT-OF-STATE PUBLISHERS?
I. Introduction
One of the most distinguishing characteristics of our present age is the
growth and influence of mass communication. Radio and television are per-
meating nearly every American home, and magazines and newspapers are being
circulated and read on an unprecedented scale. The sociological impact of
mass communication on our society and the unique problems to which it gives
rise have been duly noted.' The purpose of this Note is to concentrate on an
increasingly insistent legal problem which has come about as a by-product of
the national circulation of many magazines and newspapers. The problem
arises when one who alleges he has been libelled by one of these publications,
published outside his state of residence but circulated within it, tries to bring
an action at home before "twelve men, good and true" of his own community.
The first problem faced by such a plaintiff is to compel the appearance
of the out-of-state defendant. This can only be accomplished by service of
process upon the magazine or newspaper involved, and this requires that the
publication be subject to the personal jurisdication of the local state or federal
court.2 The modem judicial trend has been to expand the constitutional limits
within which a state can validly exercise in personam jurisdiction over non-
resident individuals and corporations.' Taking advantage of this judicial de-
velopment, the states have, with increasing regularity, enacted so-called "long-
arm" statutes to give nonresidents notice of the, activities which could make
them subject to the jurisdiction of that state. These statutes have taken various
forms. For the purpose of bringing a libel action against a nonresident pub-
lisher, there are three types of statutes which are relevant: those which subject
him to jurisdiction because he is "doing business" within the state; those which
subject him to jurisdiction because he has distributed his goods within the state;
and those which subject him to jurisdiction because of some particular act,
1 See generally PEOPLE, SOCIETY, AND MAss COMMUNICATIONS (Dexter and White eds.
1964); Scm mAM, AsS COMMUNICATIONS (1960).
2 By virtue of a recent amendment to section 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a federal district court is allowed to use the "long-arm" statute of the state in which it is sitting
to acquire in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
3 The leading cases are International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The reasons for this trend have
been well stated by the Supreme Court:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transforma-
tion of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions
touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent.
With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the
amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity. McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., supra at 222-23.
For a more thorough discussion of this judicial trend see Anderson, Personal Jurisdiction Over
Outsiders, 28 Mo. L. Rav. 336 (1963), and Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current
Problems and Modern Trends, 5 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 198 (1958).
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usually a tort, which he has committed within the state.4 It will be the last
category, the so-called "single-act statutes," which will be explored in this Note
as a possible basis for a libel proceeding against an out-of-state publisher who
merely circulates his product within the proposed forum state.' In many cases,
this kind of statute may be the only approach open to a litigant desirous of
bringing such an action.'
But a plantiff attempting to use a single-act, long-arm statute in a libel
action will encounter several legal pitfalls, any one of which may be sufficient
to prevent him from subjecting the publisher to the jurisdiction of the local
court. As in every attempt to subject a nonresident to jurisdiction, it must first
be shown that the nonresident had sufficient contacts within the state so as to
make it reasonable and just that he be obliged to defend there. There may be
some question as to whether single-act statutes meet this requirement. But, in
addition, because this is a libel action, other barriers peculiar to this branch of
law may prevent a suit in the plaintiff's home state. These barriers are the
"single publication rule" and the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
the press. This Note will analyze these obstacles in detail and examine their
effectiveness in preventing libel actions founded upon single-act statutes.
II. Minimum Contacts
The gradual liberalization of the constitutional requirements for subjecting
a nonresident defendant to the in personam jurisdiction of a state has been
adequately treated elsewhere.7 The story need be only briefly retold here for
the purpose of evaluating the constitutionality of single-act statutes. Any dis-
cussion of the present constitutional doctrine relevant to state jurisdicion over
nonresidents must begin with the landmark case of International Shoe Company
v. Washington' decided by the Supreme Court in 1945. This case overturned
a general rule of long standing, that in regard to in personam jurisdiction, due
process compels that "process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into
4 Quite often the statutes make all three activities the bases of in personam jurisdiction.
For a discussion of the various activities upon which state legislatures have pegged jurisdiction,
see Dambach, supra note 3, at 212-32.
5 Litigants frequently choose the "doing business" route in order to acquire jurisdiction
over a nonresident. An extensive list of cases dealing with "doing business" within a state by
out-of-state newspapers and magazines can be found in Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 747 (1954).
6 The following are representative of the many cases holding that a foreign publishing
corporation is not transacting business in a state when it merely ships its periodicals into the
state: Walker v. General Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Insull v. New York
World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959); Reed Real Detective Publishing Co.,
63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
There has been little litigation on the question of whether an out-of-state publisher can be
subject to a state's jurisdiction under a state long-arm allowing jurisdiction when a non-
resident distributes goods within the state. It is unlikely, however, that a state legislature
intended such statutes to encompass libel actions; usually they are aimed at a manufacturer
who ships defective products into the state. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175,
177-78 (2d Cir. 1967). But at least one court has held that a distribution of goods statute is
broad enough to sustain such an action. Putnam v. Triangle Publications, 245 N.C. 432, 96
S.E.2d 445, 453 (1957).
7 Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction
of State Courts, 25 U. Cnx. L. REv. 569 (1958); Developments in the Law-State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 H.TAv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
8 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its territory and
respond to proceedings- against them."9 The defendant had to be either literally,
or figuratively,0 within the state or had to consent to suit there. International
Shoe, involving an action for unemployment compensation taxes initiated in the
state courts by the state of Washington against an out-of-state corporation, held
that, under certain circumstances, a nonresident could be subject to the in
personam jurisdiction of another state. In personam jurisdiction was held to
attach as soon as the defendant had such "minimum contacts" with the forum
state that "maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' ,,i In finding that jurisdiction was not repugnant
to notions of fair play, the Court placed strong emphasis on the quality of the
nonresident defendant's contacts with the proposed forum state rather than the
quantity of such contacts:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to
suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.
The test is not merely, as has sometimes been suggested, whether the activity,
which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another
state, is a little more or a little less .... Whether due process is satisfied
must depend rather upon the quality and the nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to insure.12
Single-act, long-arm statutes carry this reasoning to its logical maximum
by asserting that the commission of a single tort within the state is of such sig-
nificant quality as to make it reasonable for the state to exert jurisdiction over
a nonresident who commits such an act. Thus, these statutes rely exclusively
on the quality of the defendant's contacts rather than their quantity. Since the
decision in International Shoe, single-act statutes have been enacted in numerous
jurisdictions.3 The legislative movement to adopt such statutes has been acceler-
ating, and the outlook is that more states will follow this trend."'
9 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878).
10 Because of the harshness of the Pennoyer rule, the courts engaged in various fictions in
order to find a nonresident to be "within" the proposed forum state. The most commonly used
devices were the "consent theory" and the "presence theory" whereby it was held that a
corporation, by transacting business within a state, had either consented to suit there, Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856), or established its presence there, Inter-
national Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
11 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
12 Id. at 319.
13 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1965); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c)(1960) (corporations only); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514(b) (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); IOWA CoDE ANN. § 617.3 (Supp. 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-308(b) (1964); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3201 (Supp. 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,§ 704(1) (B) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92 (1966); MCHr. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.701,
27A.715 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1966); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN.,
M. R. Crv. P. 4(B) (1) (b) (Supp. 1967) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16(A) (3) (Supp. 1965);
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. § 302(a) (3) (McKinney Supp. 1967) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a) (1965);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A) (3) (Page Supp. 1966); OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
187(a) (2) (Supp. 1966) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-235(b) (Supp. 1966) ; Tnx. Rav. Crv. STAT.
art. 2031b(4) (Vernon's 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1958) (corporations only);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2(a) (Supp. 1966); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185(1)(b)(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3083 (1961); Wsc. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1967).
14 See Legislation, Personal jurisdiction in Nebraska. The Need for a Long Arm, Statute,
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When considering the constitutionality of single-act statutes as applied to
a tort committed within the proposed forum state, the question to be asked is
whether a tort, in and of itself, is sufficient contact so as to make it reasonable
and fair for the perpetrator to defend there. The Supreme Court has yet to
speak directly on the point. But in a pre-International Shoe case, Hess v. Paw-
loski,'5 the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute which declared that use of
that state's highways by a nonresident motorist was deemed equivalent to an
appointment by him of the state registrar as his attorney for service of process
for any action growing out of an accident which the nonresident may have
had in the state. Since this case was decided in an era in which Pennoyer v.
Neff,' 6 a decision which severely restricted service of process on nonresident
defendants, was the last word on in personam jurisdiction, the Court was forced
to rely largely on a theory of implied consent. This fiction asserts that, by using
the state's roads, the defendant had impliedly consented to be subject to juris-
diction there.'" Even though the theories of "consent ' and "presence" have
given away to the doctrine of "minimum contacts," the shift in the underlying
theory of jurisdiction cannot alter the fact that the Supreme Court, by its holding,
gave explicit recognition to the contention that due process is not subverted
merely because jurisdiction rests upon a single act.'" International Shoe itself
by emphasizing the quality, rather than the quantity, of defendant's contacts,
seems to approve of basing jurisdiction on a single tort as long as that tort arises
out of defendant's activities within the state.'" And, in McGee v. International
Life Insurance Company,2 ° the Court upheld a California statute which sub-
jected foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts with its
residents, even though there was no showing that the nonresident defendant
had solicited or done any other insurance business in California apart from the
policy involved in this case."' Although McGee involved a single contract, rather
than a single tort, there would seem to be no constitutional distinction when
weighing the requirements of the due process clause.22 The only due process
limitation on in personam jurisdiction which the Court has imposed in recent
years is that the defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the proposed forum state.22
Aside from the Supreme Court, other courts which have considered single-
45 NEB. L. Rnv. 166 (1966); Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm" jurisdiction, 37 CoLo. L. REv.
309 (1965). Also, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently approved a model
long-arm statute containing single-act provisions. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL
PROCEDURE AcT § 1.03.
15 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
16 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
17 Id. at 356.
18 Note, The Virginia "Long Arm" Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 719, 746 (1965).
19 Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L.
REv. 599, 606-07 (1955).
20 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
21 Id. at 222.
22 It is significant to note that McGee cited Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corpora-
tion, 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951), a case upholding the constitutionality of Vermont's
single-act tort statute, as support for the proposition that "[iut is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State."
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 & n.2 (1957).
23 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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act,. long-arm statutes have given an overwhelming endorsement of their consti-
tutionality." Thus, when one alleges that an out-of-state publisher has com-
mitted the tort of libel against him in his state of residence, and seeks to acquire
in personam jurisdiction over the publisher on the basis of a single-act, long-arm
statute, there is little likelihood that he will be denied on the ground that to
so subject the defendant to jurisdiction would amount to a deprivation of due
process. But, although such a plaintiff may be able to easily overcome this
barrier, others, more difficult, lie ahead.
III. The Single Publication Rule
A. History
The single publication rule represents the modem judicial response to the
common-law concept of "separate publication," a theory sound in logic, but
often unworkable in practice. The common-law rule was established in the
historic English case of Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer.5 The Duke, upon learning
of a libel printed some eighteen years previously in defendant's newspaper, sent
an agent to buy from defendant a copy of the original newspaper, and then
brought suit. Against a plea of the statute of limitations, it was held that the
communication of the libel to the agent was a separate publication and, hence,
that it prevented the tolling of the statute. Under this rule, each communication
of a libel is a separate cause of action. The rule was adopted and applied in
this country as a part of the common law of libel. 6 Although one who is
libelled is in fact injured by every communication of the libel and, thus, it seems
logical that a separate cause of action arise upon each communication, the
practical problems inherent in the concept of "separate publication" gradually
undermined its legal status. If each communication is considered to be a
separate publication of the libel, there results the strong possibility of a mul-
tiplicity of suitsF and an almost endless suspension of the tolling of the statute
of limitations.
These practical considerations led the New York courts to abandon the
doctrine, at least with respect to the statute of limitations, in the well-known
case of Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Incorporated." New York had a
one-year statute of limitations for libel actions. Alleged libels concerning the
plaintiff had been published by the defendant newspaper more than one year
before the commencement of the suit. The plaintiff contended, however, that
24 See, e.g., Elkhart Eng'r Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965);
Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960); Nelson v.
Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116
Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951); Reese & Galston, Doing An Act or Causing Consequences As
Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv. 249, 259 (1959); Developments in the
Law--tate-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rv. 909, 926 (1960). But see Stimson, Omnibus
Statutes Designed to Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 48 A.B.A.J. 725 (1962)
(asserting that the defendant, or his agent, must have been physically present within the state).
25 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849).
26 Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 Rocy-Y MT. L. Rav. 263 (1953).
27 This is especially true in this era of unprecedented use of mass communications. See
Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 kcH. L. REV. 959, 960-62 (1953).
28 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1938), aff'd without opinion, 279 N.Y. 716, 18
N.E.2d 676, rehearing denied, 280 N.Y. 572, 20 N.E.2d, 21 (1939).
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he was not barred by the statute because a third party had read the alleged libel
in defendant's public library within a year before the filing of his suit. In re-
jecting plaintiff's contention that the communication to the third party was
sufficient to start the running of the statute anew, the court reasoned:
If the bar of the Statute of Limitations can be lifted by means such
as the plaintiff now seeks to employ, we may no longer term it a "statute
of repose" which makes effective a purpose which the Legislature has
conceived to be imperative - to outlaw stale claims. . Believing that
such a rule would nullify the clear purpose of the Statute of Limitations,
we affirm the order dismissing the complaint .... 29
Several jurisdictions have followed the reasoning of Wolfson and the rule
emerging from these cases has been styled as the "single publication rule.""0
Although there has not been universal agreement on the exact time at which
the libel takes place,"' all the jurisdictions adhering to the rule are in accord
that there is a single fixed point in time at which it can be said that the libel
has been committed. The time most frequently seized upon is the time at which
the alleged libellous material was first released to the public. 2
If the jurisdiction in which the litigant seeks to bring his libel action against
an out-of-state publisher follows the single publication rule, he may be in serious
trouble. This is so because the rule has been used to determine where, as well
as when, the libel took place. 3 Under this reasoning, the tort is anchored to a
particular place, and when proceeding against an out-of-state publisher, this
place is almost invariably one which is outside the state. Thus, it would seem
that the plaintiff's reliance upon a single-act statute is misplaced, for the tort
of which he is complaining has not, in the eyes of the law, been committed
within his state. Whether adherence to the single publication rule will in fact
sound the death knell for this kind of action depends on the particular jurisdic-
tion's policy towards the rule and the single-act statute involved.
B. Policy
Whether a jurisdiction will allow the single publication rule to interfere
with "long-arm" actions depends on its view of the policy underlying the rule
and the strength of its commitment to the goals which the rule seeks to achieve.
29 Id. at 213, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43.
30 The following jurisdictions adhere to the single publication rule: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. R. PHELPS & E. D. HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RIsKS,
RESPONSIBILITIES 104 (1966). In addition, the rule has been codified by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT.
31 Prosser, supra note 27, at 974.
32 R. PHELPS & E. D. HAMILTON, supra note 30, at 104; W. PRossR, THE LAW OF
TORTS 788 (3d ed. 1964).
33 This result has been reached in several state cases in which the issue was whether venue
would lie in a county other than that in which the libellous material was published. In each of
the following cases, the action was dismissed for lack of proper venue on the authority of the
single publication rule: Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193(1921) (venue to lie in the county "where the injury occurred"); O'Malley v. Statesman
Printing Co., 60 Idaho 326, 91 P.2d 357 (1939) (venue to lie in the county "in which the
cause of action arose"); Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344(1943) (venue to lie in the county "where the cause of action may occur or accrue").
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[Vol. 43:83]
A court may choose to apply the single publication rule literally in every context,
regardless of the distinct policy considerations militating against it. This wa.T
the approach of the court in Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corporation.4
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, finding that Illinois followed
the single publication rule, refused to allow the plaintiff to bring a libel action
in Illinois against the foreign corporation on the basis of the Illinois single-act
statute.3 5 The court reasoned that, since the single publication rule anchors the
tort to the place where the libel was first published, and since that place was
New York, there was no tort committed in Illinois."
The type of reasoning employed in Insull has not escaped sharp criticism.
It has been pointed out that the aim of the comprehensive long-arm statutes,
such as the Illinois statute in Insull, is to establish jurisdiction wherever con-
stitutionally possible. To hold that jurisdiction cannot be asserted unless the
last event necessary for liability has occurred in the proposed forum state is to
add an irrelevant standard." A recent decision of the Second Circuit expressly
rejected the Insull approach and closely evaluated the role which the single
publication rule should play in the area of in personam jurisdiction. Buckley
v. New York Post Corporation"' involved a libel action by William Buckley, a
resident of Connecticut, against the Post, a Delaware corporation having its
principal place of business in New York City. The Post argued that, since the
lower federal court was bound to follow Connecticut decisions favoring the
single publication rule, " it was not subject to the jurisdiction of that court
because the tort was committed, if at all, outside the state. The Court of Appeals,
Judge Friendly writing, rejected this contention:
Elliptical statements that a libel by newspaper is "complete" upon
publication, though often accurate enough in their particular context,
should not obscure that the purpose of the single publication rule is not
to deprive a plaintiff defamed in another state of a privilege to sue there
which the legislature had granted generally to persons injured by wrongful
conduct within its borders, but rather to protect the defendant - and
the courts - from a multiplicity of suits, an almost endless tolling of the
statute of limitations, and diversity in applicable substantive law... These
goals can be sufficiently accomplished by holding that that plaintiff must
collect all his damages in one action, that the statute of limitations begins
to run on the initial publication, and that substantive issues will be gov-
erned by a single law .... 40
Thus the court surmounted the barrier of the single publication rule, not by
reverting to a theory of multiple publication, but by holding the rule to be
irrelevant in a long-arm action.
34 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
35 Id. at 171.
36 Id. A similar result was reached by the Fifth Circuit in New York Times Company v.
Connor, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961). The decision in this case was subsequently vacated
after the Alabama Supreme Court held, in another case, that the Fifth Circuit had erroneously
applied Alabama law. Connor v. New York Times Co., 310 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1962).
37 Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois,
1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
38 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
39 Id. at 179.
40 Id. at 179-80.
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C. The Long-Arm Statutes
The preceding section demonstrated the two different basic philosophies
by which the courts have approached the relationship between the single publica-
tion rule and single-act, long-arm statutes. Under the Insull approach, the
plaintiff is immediately defeated because the tort upon which he is attempting
to base jurisdiction is deemed to have been completed outside the state. Under
the Buckley approach, the plaintiff is allowed to argue that the single publication
rule is inapplicable to the jurisdictional question, and that he is entitled to rely
on his state's single-act statute without regard to such a rule. Even if this is
allowed, however, the very terms of the statute upon which he relies may act
to defeat his attempt to acquire jurisdiction. For the purposes of determining
whether single-act statutes will allow defamation actions against out-of-state
publishers who merely circulate their publications within the proposed forum
state, the various statutes may be broken down into eight groups:
1) Tortious act within the state-The Illinois statute is typical - one is
subject to jurisdiction for a cause of action arising from "the commission of a
tortious act within this state,""' and has been widely followed. 2 Even if one
disregards the single publication rule, it could be persuasively argued that the
defendant publisher has committed no tortious act within the proposed forum
state; his only act was the printing and the initial distribution of the alleged
libel, all of which took place within the state of publication. This argument
seems to rely strongly upon the legislative use of the term "tortious act" rather
than "tort" as indicative of the legislature's intent to distinguish the act or con-
duct itself and any consequences thereof.
The controversy over whether "tortious act" includes the situation in which
only the consequences of defendant's act take place within the proposed forum
state has been raging in the analogous field of product liability actions against
out-of-state producers. The issue was raised in Illinois in Gray v. American
Radiation & Standard Sanitary Corporation.4 3 In that case, plaintiff was injured
by a defective product shipped into the state by the defendant. Seeking to avoid
the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts, the defendant interposed the defense that
he had committed no tortious act in Illinois - the negligence had occurred
outside of the state and only the consequences of that negligent act had taken
place within the state. The Supreme Court of Illinois discarded this defense as
a mere "technicality":
We think the intent [of the legislature] should be determined less from
technicalities of definition than from considerations of general purpose and
effect. To adopt the criteria urged by defendant would tend to promote
litigation over extraneous issues concerning the elements of a tort and
the territorial incidence of each, whereas the test should be concerned
more with those substantial elements of convenience and justice presumably
contemplated by the legislature.44
41 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
42 Other states having a similar statute are Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Washington. The location of these statutes is given
in note 13 supra.
43 22 ILL. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
44 Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
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The court went on to hold that the statute, so construed, was not an unconsti-
tutional violation of due process. 5
If the Gray reasoning is applied to libel actions in which only the con-
sequences of defendant's tortious act of publication are felt within the state, the
plaintiff would clearly be able to acquire jurisdiction under a "tortious act'
statute. The Gray rationale, however, has not been universally followed. It has
been attacked on the grounds of statutory construction 6 and constitutionality.4"
Thus, whether the libel action can be brought under the "tortious act" statute
depends on whether the particular jurisdiction follows, or can be persuaded to
follow, the Gray approach.
2) Tort in whole or in part-The typical language of this type of single-act,
long-arm statute allows jurisdiction when a nonresident "commits a tort in
whole or in part" within the state.4" The use of the term "tort" in itself tends
to avoid the problems inherent in the use of "tortious action." And the addi-
tional use of "in part" would seem to leave no doubt that this type of statute
would give jurisdiction when only the consequences of the tortious act are felt
within the proposed forum state. In Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corpo-
ration,4 9 it was held that the "in part" language in such a statute conferred
jurisdiction in a product liability case when the nonresident corporation's only
contact with the forum state was its shipment of its defective product into the
state. The Minnesota court relied upon the "tort in part" language to distinguish
the case from the contra-Gray line of decisions holding that a "tortious act"
statute does not confer jurisdiction under such circumstances." Thus, it seems
clear that a defamation action against an out-of-state publisher would be allowed
under such a statute.
3) Tortious act within the state; tortious act outside of the state plus
doing business-These single-act statutes draw a distinction between injury
that is suffered as a result of a tortious act within the state and that which is
a result of a tortious act outside of the state. The Virginia statute is an example:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person . .. as to a
cause of action arising from the person's ... (3) [c]ausing tortious injury
by an act or omission in this State; (4) [c]ausing tortious injury in this
State by an act or omission outside of this State if he regularly does or
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this State .... r" (Emphasis added.)
45 Id. at 436-44, 176 N.E.2d at 763-67. Accord, Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385
P.2d 305 (1963).
46 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 462, 261
N.Y.S.2d 8, 23 (1965).
'47 The Virginia "Long Arm" Statute, supra note 18, at 749.
48 MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1966). States having a similar provision are
Iowa, Texas, Vermont and West Virginia. The location of these statutes is given in note 13
supra.
49 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
50 Id. at 579-80, 104 N.W.2d at 893-94. Accord, Andersen v. National Presto Indus., Inc.,
257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965). Contra, Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F. Supp.
571 (N.D. W.Va. 1962) (holding that to so construe the West Virginia statute would be a
violation of due process).
51 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2(a) (Supp. 1966). States having similar statutes are Louisiana,
Ohio, and Wisconsin. The location of these statutes is given in note 13 supra.
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Under this type of statute, a nonresident publisher's liability is quite clear.
If he merely ships his publication into the state, he will only be subject to juris-
diction for a libel action if he is held to be "doing business" within the state.
4) Causing consequences to occur that result in a tort action-This type
of statute has been adopted by Michigan. It allows jurisdiction over a non-
resident for "[t]he doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur,
in the state resulting in an action for tort."52 There have been no relevant de-
cisions under this statute, but the language leaves little room for doubt that
this long-arm would reach an out-of-state publisher whose circulated publica-
tion causes consequential damage to a resident of the state.
5) Acts done within the state-The Maryland long-arm statute pro-
vides for jurisdiction on any "liability incurred for acts done within this State."5 "
Under this type of statute, it is clear that an out-of-state publisher would be
immune from jurisdiction unless he had performed some acts within the proposed
forum state. Mere shipment of the publication into the state would not be
enough.
54
6) Any cause of action relating to doing business within the state whether
or not any acts within the state constitute a cause of action-The Alabama
statute provides that:
Any non-resident . . .who shall do any business or perform any character
of work or service in this State shall . .. be deemed to have appointed
the secretary of state ...agent of such non-resident, upon whom process
may be served in any action accrued, accruing, or resulting from the doing
of such business, or the performing of such work or service, or relating
to or as an incident thereof, by any such non-resident .... And such service
shall be valid whether or not the acts done in Alabama shall of and within
themselves constitute a complete cause of action.
55
The Alabama Supreme Court has interpreted this statute as allowing jurisdic-
tion as broad as the permissible limits of due process.56 The last sentence of the
quoted part of the statute would apparently allow jurisdiction over a nonresident
publisher even though the cause of action accrues beyond the borders of the
state. Thus, it would allow an action against an out-of-state publisher whose
circulation results in an action within the state.5 7
7) Accrual within this state of a tort action-The Montana long-arm
reaches out to snare nonresidents responsible for "the commission of any act
which results in accrual within this state of a tort action."' It has been sug-
gested that this type of statute would permit jurisdiction over a nonresident
52 Mofic. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.701, 27A.715 (1962).
53 Mm. ANN. CODa art. 23, § 92 (1966).
54 Cf. Rosenberg v. Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 154 F. Supp. 6 (D. Md. 1957).
55 ALA. Cona tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1965).
56 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
57 As a matter of fact there is evidence that the act was worded in this way for the avowed
purpose of facilitating the filing of libel suits against out-of-state newspapers. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1961, at 23, col. 7.
58 MONT. REV. CODEs ANN., M.R. Csv. P. 4(B)(1)(b) (Supp. 1967).
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whose acts outside the state result in injury within the state." If this be so, the
libel action against an out-of-state publisher would clearly be allowed.
8) Libel actions disallowed-Two state legislatures answer very clearly
the question of whether their statutes allow libel actions against out-of-state
publishers. In New York, such actions are expressly disallowed under the
single-act statute;"° in Maine, the statute limits actions to those for physical
injury.6 1
D. Conclusion
The preceding sections have dwelled upon the first two barriers that a
plaintiff, aggrieved by a libel shipped into his home state by an out-of-state
publisher, must hurdle in order to compel the publisher to defend in that state.
If his state is committed to the single publication aXule, his action may be dis-
missed because of lack of in personam jurisdiction on the theory that the tort
was complete at the place of initial publication, and not within the proposed
forum state. It is submitted, however, that the approach taken by the Second
Circuit in Buckley is the more reasonable one. The single publication rule should
be considered irrelevant when considering in personam jurisdiction. The rule
arose as a response to unrelated problems; and it is unlikely that a state legislature,
adopting the rule either by express provisions or acquiescence, desires to frustrate
an otherwise permissible libel action under its long-arm statute. If the legislature
did intend to disallow such actions, it could have done so in clear terms as has
been done in New York and Maine.
Aside from the single publication rule, however, a plaintiff seeking to bring
such action may be defeated by the terminology employed in the statute upon
which he seeks to base jurisdiction. In all probability, state legislatures have
not fully considered the type of action treated in this Note when passing their
long-arm statutes. The purpose of classifying the various types of statutes and
the decisions that they have generated is to demonstrate how the terminology
employed by a legislature determines the extent of relief available to the citizens
of that state. Regrettably, the use of one term rather than another is more
likely the result of accident rather than conscious choice. In order to avoid a
repetition of the current controversy over the extent of coverage of these long-arm
acts, it will be necessary for legislatures in the future to clearly express their
intent in this regard.
IV. First Amendment
The final, and perhaps the most difficult, hurdle faced by a plaintiff
59 Currie, supra note 37, at 553 n.126.
60 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967). In the Practice Commentary to
this section it is said:
Because of the facility with which a newspaper article or a television broadcast
may find its way into the state, although its origin may be far removed, considerations
of public policy prompted the Legislature to exclude defamation from the tortious
acts which subject defendants to jurisdiction under this section. 7B MCKINNEY'S
CONSOLIDATED LAWS Or N-w YORK 433 (1963).
A "long-arm" libel action can still be brought if the plaintiff can acquire jurisdiction under one
of the other provisions of the New York statute. Tortero v. World Telegram Corp., 41 Misc.
2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1963) (jurisdiction in libel action based on defendants transaction
of business within the state).
61 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704(1) (B) (1964).
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seeking jurisdiction over an out-of-state publisher is provided by the first amend-
ment. First amendment rights enjoy high priority in our constitutional system.
And one of these "sacred" rights is freedom of expression, as epitomized in free-
dom of the press. As so eloquently put by Judge Learned Hand, the first amend-
ment's guarantee of free expression
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of
a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.
To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it
our all.
62
The first amendment is relevant in this consideration of jurisdiction over
out-of-state publishers because of the fear that newspapers and other publica-
tions might restrict their sales to those places in which such sales are substantial.
If the publisher is subject to process for libel actions in any jurisdiction in which
he circulates his product, he might choose to cut off circulation in those areas
in which return revenue is low rather than run the risk of unfair treatment by
hostile local juries63 or of the expense of defending sham suits." When viewed
in this manner, the extension of jurisdiction over out-of-state publishers may
be construed to be an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of the press.
This problem was considered by a recent Fifth Circuit decision in New
York Times Company v. Connor." This libel action was brought by a resident
of Alabama against the Times. The plaintiff attempted to establish jurisdiction'
upon the strength of Alabama decisions interpreting the Alabama statute as
allowing the state courts to exert in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents
who had committed an isolated tort within the state. The circuit court held
that the single-act statute could not constitutionally be applied because to do so
would result in curtailment of freedom of the press.
[Njewspapers with even one copy circulating within a state would con-
ceivably be subjected to libel actions and the risk of large judgments at
the hands of local juries incensed by the out-of-state newspaper's coverage
of local events. In the face of this very real risk, could a publisher justify
distribution of his product in any state where the size of his circulation
does not balance the danger of this liability? Certainly, a mere 395 issues
62 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
63 An example was the $500,000 verdict in the famous New York Times Company v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). As an intervening party in another case pointed out,
'[t]he inability to obtain a fair trial is not peculiar to the New York Times but
exists whenever a foreign publisher must defend an article or editorial away from
home and in a community that bears antipathy towards his editorial viewpoint and
his publication's content. Motion of Chicago Tribune Company to file a brief as
Amicus Curiae, at 5, in New York Times Co. v. Connor, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir.
1961).
64 The incidence of sham, or unworthy, suits is bound to increase as it becomes more con-
venient for plaintiffs to sue. The cost of defending against such suits can be substantial, espe-
cially if the defense must be entered in a court far from home. Of interest is the following
anecdote.
Some years ago the Chicago Tribune called Henry Ford an anarchist. Mr. Ford
sued the Tribune for libel and received a verdict of six cents. The Tribune never paid
that six cents because it claimed the judgment was not suable in Michigan where
the trial took place. Reported at more than $500,000, the Tribune's defense cost
$303,968.72, according to its counsel. F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS
211 (4th ed. 1962) (footnote omitted).
65 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
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per day as involved in the instant case would not be sufficient. As the
result, those people in the State of Alabama who wish to read a publication
such as the New York Times would be deprived of this opportunity. 6
The court concluded that there must be "a greater degree of contacts to
sustain jurisdiction over nonresident newspaper corporations" '7 than other non-
resident defendants, but did not specify what would be sufficient. In view of
the language employed by the court, this point would perhaps be reached when
the size of the publisher's circulation does balance the danger of liability.
The Second Circuit also took up the question of the first amendment's effect
in this area in the previously discussed case of Buckley v. New York Post Cor-
poration.es The court's approach was a balancing of the restraint placed on
the press by allowing jurisdiction against the hardship placed on the individual
by not allowing it:
Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting companies are businesses con-
ducted for profit and often make very large ones. Like other enterprises
that inflict damage in the course of performing a service highly useful to
the public, such as providers of food or shelter or manufacturers of drugs
designed to ease or prolong life, they must pay the freight; and injured
persons should not be relegated to forums so distant as to make collection
of their claims difficult or impossible unless strong policy considerations
demand it.69
Against the background of this kind of thinking, the Buckley court allowed
jurisdiction. The decision rested heavily on the fact that the Connecticut court
in which Buckley brought suit was only forty miles from the home of the Post.
Judge Friendly's opinion pointed out that the opposite result would be in-
congruous in that the Post would clearly have to defend a similar suit in Buffalo,
many more miles away; the first amendment cannot so exalt state lines."'
The Supreme Court has yet to speak on this first amendment problem.
There is precedent, however, for denying an otherwise valid assertion of juris-
diction over a nonresident because of constitutional provisions other than the
due process clause. In a series of cases, the Court has prohibited in personam
jurisdiction over nonresidents because, even though the assertion of jurisdiction
was not violative of due process, the allowance of jurisdiction would interfere
with interstate commerce." Although these cases have not been utilized by
the Court since International Shoe, they apparently have not been abandoned."'
66 Id. at 572.
67 Id. at 573.
68 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
69 Id. at 182.
70 Id. at 184.
71 The leading case is Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Go., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
Others are Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan C.R.R. v. Mix, 278
U.S. 492 (1929); Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924). However, the Court
has held that, where the nonresident's contacts are many, jurisdiction will be sustained even if
this results in a burden on interstate commerce. Missouri ex reL. St. Louis, B. & M.Ry. v.
Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924).
72 See Overstreet v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Hershel
Radio Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 334 Mich. 148, 54 N.W.2d 286 (1952); Hayman v. Southern
Pac. Co., 278 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1955) (alternative ground). In Erlanger Mills, Incorporated
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As such, they could serve as precedent for a holding that the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over out-of-state publishers on the basis of a single tort, while satisfying
the "minimal contacts" of due process, is unconstitutional under the first
amendment. The fact that a state may be exercising a legitimate state interest
in asserting jurisdiction would also be disregarded if the Court should find
that the exercise of that interest unduly impinges first amendment freedoms."'
There is little doubt that the first amendment should play a role in this area
of expanding jurisdiction over out-of-state publishers. The extent of that role
depends to a certain degree upon whether one approaches that amendment
as an "absolutist" or a "balancer." 4 But even under the "absolute test," there
is a recognition of legitimate state interests.7 It is submitted that the effect of
the first amendment on long-arm libel actions should be considered on a case-by-
case basis. In each case, the court should consider the distance the defendant
publisher must travel in order to defend, the resources of the defendant,76 and
the number of publications distributed in the jurisdiction that is proposed as a
forum. To proceed on a case-by-case basis is more tortuous and less expedient
than the alternative of proceeding under a hard-and-fast rule denying such
jurisdiction on first amendment grounds. But, as Buckley points out, injured
persons must also be protected; their claims should not be made practically
worthless unless there are very strong policy considerations that mandate it.
V. Conclusion
A plaintiff seeking to utilize a single-act, long-arm statute to acquire jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state publisher in a libel action is faced with serious obstacles.
Just to get the defendant into court he may be forced to wage three separate
battles, with the outcome of each being by no means certain. If his jurisdiction
follows the single publication rule, he must first persuade the court that such
a rule is irrelevant in considering whether the tort of libel was committed in
the state within the meaning of that state's long-arm statute. Secondly, he must
show that such an action is contemplated by the terms of his state's statute.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Incorporated, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956), it was suggested
that xpanding jurisdictional concepts since International Shoe may indicate the increased use-
fulness of this limitation in order to prevent undue burdens on commerce that might arise
under the current extensions of state power that have been held to satisfy due process.
73 See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) in which the Court struck
down an otherwise legitimate tax on newspapers because it thought the tax was too great a
restraint on freedom of the press. Grosjean was heavily relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in
Connor as support for its position that the granting of jurisdiction would unduly hamper a
free press. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1966).
74 A full discussion of these approaches is clearly beyond the scope of this Note. For an
excellent treatment of the various theories on the first amendment, see Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALa L.J. 877 (1963). See also Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Rnv. 245; Leflar, The Free-ness of Free
Speech, 15 VAND. L. RV. 1073 (1962); Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes":
A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rmv. 549 (1962).
75 See Emerson, supra note 74, at 914.
76 The purpose, of course, is not to penalize the affluent publisher. But the first amend-
ment argument strongly relies upon the possibility that the publisher may eliminate circulation
in a particular jurisdiction because of a fear of incurring the expense of defending a suit in that
jurisdiction. Such curtailment is more likely to come from the marginal publisher than one who
services a nationwide market as a matter of course.
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And, thirdly, he must show that to allow jurisdiction is not unconstitutional
as violative of the safeguards of either due process or the first amendment.
As has been illustrated, some of these obstacles appear to be more the
result of chance rather than deliberate choice. The single publication rule has
crept into this area as a ready-made legal maxim adopted by courts apparently
unaware that the rule was a judicial response to problems unrelated to questions
of in personam jurisdiction. The uncertainty arising from the terms of the
various single-act statutes is definitely attributable to the failure of the legislatures
to make clear the extent of coverage of their long-arm statutes. The obstacle
posed by the first amendment, however, is a very serious one that calls for a
careful evaluation of the effect of expanding jurisdiction upon freedom of the
press. Taken together, these various considerations combine to place an over-
whelming burden on a party attempting to recover on an alleged libel by an
out-of-state publisher under a single-act, long-arm statute.
Frank H. Smith
